Eleventh Circuit holds that, under Chevron doctrine, Immigration and Naturalization Service did not abuse its discretion in dismissing asylum application by six-year-old Cuban boy made against wishes of Cuban parent



Eleventh Circuit holds that, under Chevron doctrine, Immigration and Naturalization Service did not abuse its discretion in dismissing asylum application by six-year-old Cuban boy made against wishes of Cuban parent 
In Cuba, plaintiff Elian Gonzalez was born in December 1993 to Juan Miguel and Elizabeth Gonzalez who separated when plaintiff was three. Elizabeth kept custody of plaintiff although Juan Miguel had regular and meaningful contacts with him. On November 22, 1999, Elizabeth left Cuba to take plaintiff to the U.S. along with twelve other Cuban nationals. But when strong winds and rough seas capsized their small boat off the coast of Florida, eleven of the passengers died, including plaintiff's mother. 
Plaintiff survived by clinging to an inner tube for two days. Florida fishermen rescued plaintiff at sea and took him for treatment at a Miami hospital. At the instance of Miami resident and great-uncle, Lazaro Gonzalez, INS officials put off plaintiff's immigration inspection and paroled him into Lazaro's custody and care.
Aided by a Miami attorney, Lazaro filed two applications for asylum on plaintiff's behalf and plaintiff signed a third request himself. The applications alleged that the Castro government had persecuted many members of plaintiff's family for opposing the communist government, e.g., by imprisoning two of plaintiff's great-uncles for their political activity. Moreover, if the U.S. sent plaintiff back to Cuba, the complaint alleged that the government would exploit him as a "propaganda tool" and would involuntarily indoctrinate him in communist dogma. 
When an INS official interviewed Juan Miguel at his Cuban home, the latter spurned any claim for asylum by his six-year-old and demanded plaintiff's immediate return to his custody. INS officials in Miami next met with Lazaro and several lawyers. Lazaro continued to maintain that the Cuban government was coercing Juan Miguel to demand plaintiff's return to Cuba. An INS official again talked to Juan Miguel in Cuba and concluded that he genuinely and freely wanted plaintiff to come back to Cuba.
In January 2000, the INS Commissioner turned down plaintiff's applications for asylum as legally void for lack of plaintiff's capacity to file his own applications against the wishes of his father. Acting by and through Lazaro as next friend, plaintiff sued in federal court to compel the INS to rule on the merits of his applications. The district court, however, summarily dismissed the complaint and plaintiff appealed. Preliminarily, the Circuit Court enjoined Elian's removal from the U.S. pending the appeal [see 2000 International Law Update 59].
Plaintiff contended that the lower court had violated due process and erred in not appointing a guardian ad litem for Elian. Rejecting these two points without extended discussion, the appellate court focuses on the dismissal of plaintiffs claim under 8 U.S.C. Section 1158 which provides in part that "[a]ny alien...may apply for asylum." In plaintiff's view, the statute includes himself despite his young age.
The INS replied by contending that Section 1158 does not speak to the issue of a six-year-old's capacity to file an application for asylum against the wishes of the child's parent. In such instances, the INS was free to fashion a policy that Juan Miguel be the one to decide whether to seek asylum for plaintiff and thus to regard plaintiff's and Lazaro's application(s) as legally void. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms the lower court.
The basic issue is plaintiff's capacity to file his or her own independent asylum claim under the circumstances of this case. "The important legal question in this case, therefore, is not whether Plaintiff may apply for asylum; that a six-year-old is eligible to apply for asylum is clear. The ultimate inquiry, instead, is whether a six-year-old child has applied for asylum within the meaning of the statute when he, or a non-parental relative on his behalf, signs and submits a purported application against the express wishes of the child's parent." [Slip op. 5].
So much for what Section 1158 does say; the problem is how to deal with what Congress did not say. "The statute does not set out procedures for the proper filing of an asylum application. Furthermore, the statute does not identify the necessary contents of a valid asylum application. In short, although the statute requires the existence of some application procedure so that aliens may apply for asylum, section 1158 says nothing about the particulars of that procedure." [Id.]
Noting that the courts cannot properly reexamine the wisdom of an agency-promulgated policy to fill the gaps left by Congress, this Court outlines the discretionary policy choice the INS made in this case. The INS decided that six-year-old children lack the capacity to personally submit an asylum application without the representation of an adult. In the absence of special circumstances, the child's parent is the only proper adult to assume this role, even though the parent resides abroad. Especially in light of the statutory hiatus, it cannot be said that these positions by the INS are unreasonable.
Finally, "[T]hat the parent lives in a communist-totalitarian state (such as Cuba), in and of itself, does not constitute a special circumstance requiring the selection of a non-parental representative. Our duty is to decide whether this policy might be a reasonable one in the light of the statutory scheme. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)." [Slip op. 6]
The Court does, however, express some misgivings. "We recognize that, in some instances, the INS policy of deferring to parents -- especially those residing outside of this country -- might hinder some six-year-olds with non-frivolous asylum claims and prevent them from invoking their statutory right to seek asylum. But, considering the well-established principles of judicial deference to executive agencies, we cannot disturb the INS policy in this case just because it might be imperfect. (Cits.) And we cannot invalidate the policy -- one with international-relations implications -- selected by the INS merely because we personally might have chosen another." [Slip op. 7].
Finally, the Court applies the above principles to the facts of this case. "No one should doubt that, if Plaintiff returns to Cuba, he will be without the degree of liberty that people enjoy in the United States. Also, we admit that re-education, communist indoctrination, and political manipulation of Plaintiff for propaganda purposes, upon a return to Cuba, are not beyond the realm of possibility. Nonetheless, we cannot say that the INS's assessment of Plaintiff's asylum claim -- that it probably lacked merit -- was arbitrary. To make a meritorious asylum claim, an asylum applicant must show that he has a 'well- founded fear of persecution' in his native land. (Cit.) Congress largely has left the task of defining with precision the phrase 'well- founded fear of persecution' to the INS. (Cits.)
"Plaintiff points to no earlier INS adjudications or judicial decisions where a person, in circumstances similar to Plaintiff's, was found to have established a 'well-founded fear of persecution.' Political conditions 'which affect the populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient to establish [persecution].' (Cit.) We cannot say that the INS had to treat education and indoctrination as synonymous with 'persecution.' (Cits.) Not all exceptional treatment is persecution." [Slip op. 9-10]
In sum, the INS did not abuse its considerable discretion in this matter.
Citation: Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-11424 (11th Cir. June 1, 2000).
 


Magdalena Cuprys is the principal of Serving Immigrants, a full-service immigration law firm offering a complete range of immigration services to both businesses and individuals. The law firm is uniquely qualified to manage the most contentious and unusual immigration needs. Swift resolution of immigration-related issues is integral to a client’s ability to conduct business or reach their personal goals in the United States. Located in Miami and Clewiston, the firm’s offices provide corporate and individual clients of foreign nationality with temporary work permits for the U.S., green card petitions, criminal waivers and representation in removal proceedings cases. With over a decade of experience, the law firm provides clients with the confidence that their cases will be handled by an expert who understands their needs and how to obtain their goals. Although the majority of the law firm’s clients live in Florida, it represents people from all over the United States and several foreign countries.

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